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Internet anonymity and the boundaries of the rights of
anonymous Internet speakers is a growing issue. The First Amendment
also protects anonymous speech. In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission,' the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an Ohio law that
prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign material. But the
McIntyre decision concerned offline communications-fliers. A
question remains as to whether the courts have, or are willing, to apply
McIntyre to anonymous Internet communications, and if so, is that
application limited only to political speech. This study examines these
questions in an attempt to understand what impact McIntyre has had on
the protection of online anonymity by presenting a textual analysis of
cases in which subpoenas have been issued to identify anonymous online
commenters.
* Assistant Professor, S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communication,
Syracuse University.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Internet anonymity and the boundaries of the rights of
anonymous Internet speakers is a growing issue, an issue made
interesting by the fascinating cases that spur its discussion. Take, for
instance, the 2009 case of The Sun-News of Myrtle Beach, which
threatened to disclose the identity of an online commenter called "Elmer
Fudd," after the newspaper received a subpoena from the Myrtle Beach
2
Chamber of Commerce. In August 2009, "Elmer Fudd" logged on to
The Sun-News Online site and posted a comment inquiring why no one
had covered the raid by the Horry County Sheriffs Department at the
3Chamber's offices. The Chamber claimed that no such raid ever
happened and filed for a subpoena against the paper asking for the true
identity of "Elmer" as part of a possible defamation suit.4  The
newspaper gave "Elmer" until October 2, 2009 to reveal himself or else
it would turn over the identifying information it had collected to the
Chamber's lawyers. Two days before the deadline, "John Doe" filed a
motion in the county court asking the judge to hold off enforcing the
2. See Joel Allen, Elmer Fudd Identity Remains a Secret, CAROLINALIVECOM
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subpoena because it violated the commenter's right to anonymous
6
speech.
In a similar situation, a Cook County, Illinois judge ruled that the
Chicago Daily Herald and Comcast had to hand over the name of an
individual who posted a comment on the Daily Herald website directed
at the son of local official Lisa Stone. Claiming the commenter posted
"defamatory and injurious" statements, Stone demanded the newspaper
reveal the commenter's identity. At first the newspaper refused, but
after being served with a subpoena, the newspaper turned over the
commenter's e-mail address and other identifying information. 9 After
finding that the e-mail address had been deactivated, Stone then
subpoenaed Comcast, the commenter's Internet Service Provider.' 0
Both the "Elmer Fudd" and Daily Herald cases involve
anonymous speakers who are alleged to have committed defamation
while posting anonymously. But anonymous Internet speakers have also
faced suits for violating copyright, invasion of privacy, and other torts.
And claims have not been limited solely to anonymous comments on
newspaper sites; plaintiffs have also sought the identities of bloggers and
those posting on Web forums in order to file claims against them.12
Although such claims may appear innocuous, the possible
ramifications for freedom of speech, specifically for freedom of speech
6. See id.
7. Jamie Sotonoff, Judge: Reveal who Posted Comment about Buffalo Grove






11. See e.g., Sinclair v. TubeSockTedD, 596 F. Supp. 2d 128 (D.D.C. 2009)
(claiming reckless misrepresentation as well as libel); Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F.
Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008) (claiming invasion of privacy and negligent infliction
of emotional distress in addition to a libel claim); Alvis Coatings v. John Does 1-10,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30099 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 2, 2004) (claiming that anonymous
comments violated the Lanham Act); Matthew Mazzotta, Note, Balancing Act:
Finding Consensus on Standards for Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51
B.C. L. REV. 833 (2010).
12. See e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) (suing for posts made on
a blog forum); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (suing
for posts made on a financial website).
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on the Internet, could be severe. It is axiomatic that the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution protects freedom of speech
and the press. 13 The First Amendment guarantee of free expression
constrains laws such as those prohibiting defamation, invasion of
privacy, and copyright infringement.14 The First Amendment also
protects anonymous speech. In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission,15 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an Ohio law that
prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign material.'
According to the Court, speakers may want to remain anonymous for
fear of physical, social, and economic reprisal, as "[a]nonymity is a
shield from the tyranny of the majority."17  The Court seemingly
reasserted this position six years later when it ruled that a village
ordinance requiring door-to-door solicitors to register with the city was
unconstitutional. 8
But the McIntyre decision concerned offline communications-
fliers. A question remains as to whether the courts have, or are willing,
to apply the McIntyre decision to anonymous Internet communications,
and if so, whether that application is limited only to political speech.
This study examines these questions in an attempt to understand what
impact McIntyre has had on the protection of online anonymity by
presenting a textual analysis of cases in which subpoenas have been
issued to identify anonymous online commenters. Section II of this
Article recounts the McIntyre decision and its influence from a scholarly
perspective, as well as provides an overview of the doctrine regarding
anonymous speech springing from that case. Section III outlines the
methodology employed for this textual analysis. Section IV sets forth
the themes that emerged during the analysis of the cases gathered.
13. The First Amendment reads, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no
law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
14. See Eugene Volokh, Tort Liability and the Original Meaning of Freedom
of Speech, Press, and Petition, 96 IOWA L. REV. 249 (2010); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 Yale L.J. 1757 (1995).
15. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
16. See id. at 357.
17. Id. at 357.
18. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536
U.S. 150 (2002).
19. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 337.
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Section V discusses the studies' findings and offers an analysis of how
courts deciding whether to unmask anonymous online commenters have
used the McIntyre decision and what this means for online anonymity.
II. ANONYMITY AND THE SUPREME COURT
Anonymity has been defined as the state of being
unidentifiable.20 Although anonymity is most often linked to names or
physical descriptions, there is more than one thing that provides an
individual with anonymity. 2' G. T. Marx, for instance, recognized seven
types of identity knowledge: name, location, "pseudonyms that can be
linked to . . . name and/or locat[ion]-literally a form of pseudo-
anonymity," "pseudonyms that can not be linked to other forms of
identity knowledge-the equivalent of 'real' anonymity," patterns,
"social categorization," and "symbols of eligibility/non-eligibility." 2 2
With respect to speech, anonymity has been defined as "the condition in
which a message source is absent or largely unknown to a message
recipient."23 The absence of information identifying the source of speech
has been a cause for concern as well as being viewed as beneficial,
particularly with respect to the Internet.24
Some scholars predicted that the ability to remain unidentified in
cyberspace would allow Internet users to avoid responsibility for their
speech.25 In both the on- and off-line contexts, anonymity was thought
20. See G. T. Marx, What's in a Name? Some Reflections on the Sociology of
Anonymity, 15 INFO. SOC'Y 99, 100 (1999). For the purposes of this paper anonymity
includes pseudonymity.
21. See Kris M. Markman & Craig R. Scott, Anonymous Internet? Examining
Identity Issues in Email Addresses, in ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE INT'L COMMC'N
Ass'N, NEW YORK, N.Y., 8 (2005).
22. See Marx, supra note 20.
23. Craig R. Scott, Benefits and Drawbacks of Anonymous Online
Communication: Legal Challenges and Communicative Recommendations, 41 FREE
SPEECH YEARBOOK 127, 128 (2004).
24. See e.g., Andrea Chester & Gillian Gwynne, Online Teaching:
Encouraging Collaboration through Anonymity, 4 J. COMPUTER MEDIATED COMM.
(1998) available at http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol4/issue2/chester.html (examining the
advantages of anonymity and pseudonymity in online learning); see also A. Michael
Froomkin, Legal Issues in Anonymity and Pseudonymity, 15 INFO. SOC'Y 113, 114-
16 (1999); Scott, supra note 23.
25. See Froomkin, supra note 24, at 114.
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to be undesirable because it would allow individuals to act without fear
26
of the consequences for their speech or actions. Further, anonymity is
an impediment to trust, which may then lead to "undesirable social
institutions.',27 For example, in their study of chat rooms on sensitive
issues, Eric Friedman and Paul Resnick noted that many of the
individuals taking part in the conversations were in fact frauds.28 The
researchers placed the blame for the chat room deception on the ability of
chat room participants to maintain a high level of anonymity.29 Another
frustration with anonymous speech is the inability of those who fall
victim to libel to obtain relief from the perpetrators of this false speech.30
According to Craig Scott, "some individuals are able to successfully hide
behind the veil of anonymity and disparage others."3 1
Yet anonymity is not without its recognized benefits. One such
32
benefit is that anonymity may encourage more speech. According to
Kris Markman and Craig Scott, anonymity may foster an Internet
environment that encourages individuals to be more open with
information that they may otherwise never disclose.33 This may include
34
seeking and posting information related to embarrassing health issues.
In addition, anonymity encourages open debate on political and social
issues.35  "Not everyone is so courageous as to wish to be known for
everything they say, and some timorous speech deserves
encouragement."36 Speakers who would otherwise fear reprisal from
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. See Eric J. Friedman & Paul Resnick, The Social Cost of Cheap
Pseudonyms, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 173, 175 (2001) (citing Denise
Grady, Faking Pain and Suffering in Internet Support Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,
1998, at Gl).
29. See id.
30. See Froomkin, supra note 24, at 114.
31. Scott, supra note 23, at 130.
32. See Froomkin, supra note 24, at 115; Scott, supra note 23, at 131.
33. Markman & Scott, supra note 21, at 7-8 (citing A.N. Joinson, Self-
Disclosure in Computer Mediated Communication, 31 EUR. J. Soc. PYSCHOL. 177
(2001)).
34. See Froomkin, supra note 24, at 115.
35. See Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability:
Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1642
(1995).
36. Froomkin, supra note 24, at 115.
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their employers, members of government, and other private citizens may
be more likely to express themselves online if given anonymity.37 These
benefits of anonymity are similar to those found by the U.S. Supreme
Court in its decision in McIntyre.
A. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission
In the spring of 1988, facing a $4 million budget hole,
administrators of schools in the Westerville, Ohio public school district
met to discuss a tax levy. While school officials inside Blendon Middle
School discussed the upcoming referendum, outside, Margaret McIntyre,
assisted by her son and a friend, placed fliers on the windshields of the
cars in the parking lot.3 9 The fliers, some of which identified McIntyre
as the author, urged voters to defeat Issue 19, the tax levy for the school
40
district. While she distributed the fliers, a school official warned her
that she was in violation of Ohio election laws that prohibited the
distribution of unsigned leaflets.'1 Undeterred, McIntyre returned the
next evening to another meeting to distribute fliers.42
Voters defeated the tax levy twice before it passed in the fall of
the same year, after which, the school official who had warned McIntyre
that she was in violation of state law filed a complaint with the Ohio
Elections Commission.43 Agreeing that McIntyre had indeed violated the
election law, the Commission fined her $100. McIntyre originally won
her appeal to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, but the Ohio
Court of Appeals then reversed this decision, and the Ohio Supreme
Court affirmed.44
37. Branscomb, supra note 35, at 1642.
38. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 337 (1995).
39. See id.
40. Id. Some of the fliers stated, in pertinent part: "PLEASE VOTE NO [ON]
ISSUE 19[.] THANK YOU. CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS." Id.
at 337 n.2.
41. Id. at 338.
42. See id.
43. See id. The Ohio law stated, in pertinent part: "No person shall write, print,
post, or distribute... a notice,.. .or any other form of general publication which is
designed to ... promote the adoption or defeat of any issue." OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3599.09(A) (1988).
44. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 339.
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The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ohio high court, holding
that the freedom to publish anonymously was protected by the First
Amendment.4 5 The Court's holding reflected a long history of protection
for anonymous speech in the United States. Along with referencing the
46Federalist Papers, which were written anonymously, as well as taking
judicial notice of the many pseudononymously written works of fiction,
the Court reflected on its rulings protecting anonymous publications. 7
In Talley v. California,48 the Court held that the First Amendment
protected the publication and distribution of pamphlets advocating the
boycott of certain California businesses. 49 The Court found that the
California city ordinance prohibiting all anonymous leafleting could not
pass strict scrutinyo in that it was not limited to only anonymously
published fraudulent or libelous materials, but was overbroad in
prohibiting speech that was otherwise protected under the Constitution.
Applying its Talley ruling to the McIntyre case, the Court found
that like the California ordinance, the Ohio election law was overbroad in
52
that it prohibited otherwise protected speech. In fact, McIntyre had
been engaged in political speech, the kind of speech at the core of the
First Amendment.53 Had the Ohio statute prohibited only fraudulent or
libelous political speech, the state may have been able to demonstrate the
compelling government interest needed to pass strict scrutiny.54 The
Commission, likewise, was unpersuasive in arguing that the state had an
interest in providing additional information to those receiving the
anonymously authored information.s
45. Id. at 341-42.
46. Id. at 343 n.6.
47. See id. at 341.
48. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
49. See id. at 65.
50. To pass "strict scrutiny" or "exacting scrutiny" a law must be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See Burston v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,
199-208 (1992); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 786 (1978);
51. See Talley, 362 U.S. at 64.
52. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 344.
53. See id. at 346.
54. See id. at 351-53. Indeed, Ohio already had a law prohibiting fraudulent
political speech. See OHIO REV. CODE § 3599.09 (A) (1988).
55. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348-51.
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The reasoning the Court provided for protecting anonymous
speech is most pertinent to the discussion in this study. According to the
Court, "[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority."5 The
possible motives for speaking anonymously are many: to avoid official
or economic retaliation, to avoid ostracism, or to protect personal
privacy. Whatever the motivation, the marketplace of ideas welcomes
58
anonymous speech. This is particularly so for controversial political
issues. The First Amendment protects these ideas from suppression.
Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by then Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, criticized the majority opinion in his dissent.9 According to
Justice Scalia, speaker identity was less deserving of First Amendment
protection than political speech because speaker identity did not convey a
political idea.60 Further, the challenged statute did not prohibit the
expression of a political idea, but only required that the author of that
idea be identified.61 Because the Ohio statute prohibiting anonymous
publication of political speech did not go to the heart of speech protected
by the First Amendment, Justice Scalia felt the Court should have given
the legislation precedence over McIntyre's constitutional claim. 62In
addition, Justice Scalia found that the state's interest in protecting the
electorate was compelling, and therefore outweighed any First
Amendment protection for anonymity.63
According to Amy Constantine, the different conclusions arrived
at by the majority and dissent in McIntyre illustrate their fundamental
differences in assumptions about human behavior.64 The majority
viewed anonymity as rooted in the heart of democratic governance,
whereas the dissent thought that anonymity did not play a significant role
in the political process.65 Further, the dissent viewed a prohibition on
56. Id. at 357.
57. See id. at 341-42.
58. See id. at 342.
59. See id. at 371 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 378 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. See id. at 375-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. See id. at 381-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64. Amy Constantine, What's in a Name?: Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission: An Examination of the Protection Afforded to Anonymous Political
Speech, 29 CONN. L. REV. 459, 467 (1996).
65. See id at 469.
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requiring identifying information as opening the door for questionable
activities including false statements and deceit.
B. Implications of McIntyre in Cyberspace
The McIntyre decision established two propositions about
anonymous speech: legitimate reasons exist in support of anonymity, and
identity information could not be compelled without adequate
67justification. Laws that prohibit anonymity were content regulations
and would never pass strict scrutiny because they would regulate
68protected speech.
More than this, McIntyre can be viewed as supporting
anonymous online speech. First, the Court concluded that it is the
1 .~~69 Tedcs
speaker's choice whether to provide identity information. The decision
to exclude this information is no different than excluding information
from the substance of the speech. The McIntyre Court also refused to
conflate anonymous speech with speech that is fraudulent or libelous, but
instead, the Court held anonymous speech in high esteem using words
like "honorable" to describe it. 70 In addition, the Court in McIntyre
ignored the possibility that anonymous speech could be abhorrent and
instead focused on the increase in public debate possible under the
promise of anonymity. 71 Online speech, particularly speech of a political
nature, and the offline speech in McIntyre parallel, 72 and thus, should be
provided the same protections as its analog equivalent.
A strong case exists for granting some anonymous online speech
First Amendment protection. What about fraudulent or defamatory
speech? In McIntyre, the Court agreed that the state had a compelling
interest in protecting its citizens from libelous or false speech.73 It is also
66. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 382-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
67. Lee Tien, Who's Afraid ofAnonymous Speech? Mcintyre and the Internet,
75 OR. L. REV. 117, 126 (1996).
68. See id at 127-28.
69. See id. at 141.
70. See id. at 141-42.
71. See id at 142.
72. JONATHAN D. WALLACE, NAMELESS IN CYBERSPACE: ANONYMITY ON THE
INTERNET 1, 3 (1999).
73. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348-49 (1995).
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axiomatic that the First Amendment does not extend to libelous speech,
and libel law is supposed to have a deterrent effect on false speech.74 A
problem occurs, however, where too much speech is deterred. This
chilling effect could influence would-be Internet posters to engage in
self-censorship.
As a preliminary issue, libel suits against online speakers usually
seek to unmask posters. As a result, Internet users afraid of losing their
anonymity may then refuse to discuss controversial issues for fear of
being accused of defamation.75 Further, Internet users might not be able
to afford the high costs of litigation associated with defending
themselves against a libel claim.7 The prohibitive cost of litigation
could be used as a threat against an Internet speaker even if they have not
77
defamed another individual or company.
Courts have, however, begun to recognize and set standards for
deciding whether to unmask anonymous online speakers. These
standards are distilled from the various judicial tests recognized in
different jurisdictions in which a court has had to determine whether an
78
online speaker's anonymity was protected under the First Amendment.
One of the best-known balancing tests was established in Dendrite
International Inc. v. Doe No. 3.79 The Dendrite test, which has been
adopted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland80 and also used with
modifications by a New York appellate court,8 appears to be the most
dominant standard for deciding whether to unmask an online libel
82
defendant.
74. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 888 (2000).
75. See id. at 889.
76. See id. at 890-91.
77. See id at 890.
78. See Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Krinsky
v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451
(Del. 2005); Dendrite Int'l Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super Ct. App.
Div. 2001).
79. 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
80. See Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 456 (Md. 2009).
81. See Greenbaum v. Google, Inc., 845 N.Y.S.2d 695, 698-99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2007).
82. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We
Learn from John Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REv. 1373, 1378 n.25 (2009).
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The Dendrite test requires that the defendant be given notice and
an opportunity to file a motion to quash the subpoena for their identity
information.83 The plaintiff is then required to produce evidence of a
valid libel claim.84  The plaintiff must identify, with specificity, the
statements within the defendant's control that were allegedly
defamatory.8 The court then makes the determination as to whether the
plaintiff has presented a prima facie case of defamation.8 Finally, the
court must balance the defendant's First Amendment right to anonymity
against the strength of the plaintiffs evidence of defamation and the
necessity of disclosing the defendant's identity.8 According to Lyrissa
Barnett Lidsky, this final component of the Dendrite test provides added
weight toward preserving anonymity.
Although many courts use the Dendrite test, some jurisdictions
have established their own standards for online defamation cases
involving anonymous speakers. The Supreme Court of Delaware, in Doe
v. Cahill,8 for example, established a two-part test that appears to rival
Dendrite in terms of adoption by other jurisdictions.90 Courts in
Californian and Arizona92 have also created multi-component tests for
deciding whether to compel the identification of anonymous speakers. 9 3





88. Lidsky, supra note 82, at 1380 ("An explicit balancing test serves only to
tilt the scales further toward the protection of anonymous speech . . .
89. 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
90. The Doe v. Cahill test requires that: (1) the plaintiff demonstrate that their
claim can survive a motion for summary judgment, and (2) the plaintiff makes
reasonable efforts to notify the defendant including posting a message on the same
medium the defendant used. Id. at 459-61.
91. See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
92. See Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
93. The Krinsky court noted that Cahill required the plaintiff demonstrate that
their case could survive a motion for summary judgment in contrast to other courts
that required the plaintiff to prove that their case could survive a motion to dismiss.
Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 243-46. The Krinsky court declined, however, to place
procedural labels on the level of evidence the plaintiff had to produce. Id. The
Mobilisa court, in adopting the two-step Cahill analysis, added a third step of
balancing the parties' competing interests. Mobilisa, Inc., 170 P.3d at 720-21.
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The question remains, however, as to the influence of the McIntyre
decision in these cases and the standards that have developed in relation
to online defamation.
In her 2001 Washington & Lee Law Review article, Caroline
Strickland argued that key differences exist between the speech at issue
in McIntyre and the kind of speech involved in "cybersmears," or online
defamation.9 4  In her view, these differences should make McIntyre
inapplicable in online defamation cases.95 First, McIntyre involved a
content-based restriction on speech and a prior restraint on speech, which
is why the Supreme Court used strict scrutiny in evaluating whether the
Ohio election law was constitutional.96 Although the Court ultimately
invalidated the Ohio law, it did so based on the fact that the speech at
issue was political.97 Further, the litigation of online defamation is not a
prior restraint on speech as was the case in McIntyre;98 online defamation
99
defendants are not facing a prior restraint on their speech.
Another factor that distinguishes cybersmears from the speech at
issue in McIntyre is the fact that online defamation involves false or
libelous speech.' 00  This removes the speech from being absolutely
protected under the Constitution. 0' Strickland also notes that the speech
at issue in online defamation suits usually involves comments on
corporations or business practices.102 This differentiates cybersmears
from the anonymous fliers distributed in McIntyre, which were critical of
the government, and therefore, political speech. Although the publication
of truthful information is protected, traditionally the Court has not placed
94. Caroline E. Strickland, Note, Applying McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission to Anonymous Speech on the Internet and the Discovery of John Doe's
Identity, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1537, 1571 (2001).
95. See id. at 1583.
96. Id. at 1572-74.
97. Id. at 1573.
98. Id. at 1574 (noting, in addition, that the McIntyre Court did not discuss the
issue of prior restraint).
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (ruling
that false statements were not automatically removed from First Amendment
protection).
102. Strickland, supra note 94, at 1574-75.
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a value on false speech. The McIntyre Court recognized that there was
no value in fraudulent or libelous speech.104 "Heavy" reliance on
McIntyre in cases involving online defamation, according to Strickland,
is misplaced.'05 In addition, Strickland argues that the Dendrite court,
and others, misapplied McIntyre, inappropriately balancing the
defendant's rights against the rights of the plaintiff to disclosure of the
defendant's identity.106
Strickland suggests that, because of the differences between
McIntyre and online defamation cases, McIntyre does not extend to
"anonymous unlawful speech such as the Internet postings challenged in
cybersmear lawsuits."'o This does not recognize, however, that
plaintiffs are asking for the discovery of the defendant's identity before
there is an actual adjudication of whether the comments at issue are truly
defamatory. As such, a court's use of McIntyre may provide a form of
shield, then, for innocent anonymous commenters.
III. METHODOLOGY
In the field of law, the influence of a case is determined by the
citations to, and the use of, the case in cases following. Under the
doctrine of stare decisis, like cases are resolved in a like manner.1os
Lower courts are bound by the decisions of the intermediate appellate
and high courts within their jurisdiction, as well as the U.S. Supreme
Court. To demonstrate adherence to precedent, or a certain specific idea,
courts use in text citation to the prior case.
To determine the influence and use of the McIntyre case, the
researcher began this study with a series of searches of computerized
103. Id. at 1575. See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340
(1964) (noting that there was no constitutional value in false speech); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("It may be
urged that deliberately and maliciously false statements have no conceivable value
as free speech.").
104. McIntyre v Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 349 (1995).
105. Strickland, supra note 94, at 1576.
106. Id. at 1578-79.
107. Id at 1563.
108. See Dickerson v. United States, 503 U.S. 428, 443 (2000); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992).
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legal databases seeking both court decisions in cases in which a plaintiff
made a discovery motion for the identity of a defendant based on the
defendant's online expressive activities.' 09  The researcher used the
common legal databases LexisNexis and WestLaw. First, a search was
conducted to find all items that cited the McIntyre case. This preliminary
search produced 1853 citing works. Of these citing works, 432 were
court opinions. To further narrow these cases to only those involving
online speech, the researcher used the focus search function in
LexisNexis and the focus words "Internet" and "online." This provided a
result of thirty-eight cases. The researcher also searched the Citizen
Media Law Project's Legal Threat Database to find court filings and
cases related to anonymous online commenters.' Cases were filtered to
include only those involving speech and not conduct or criminal
behavior.
To perform an analysis of these cases, the researcher obtained
the full text of the court decisions. As a preliminary step, the researcher
noted the type of online media at issue, as well as the claim for which the
plaintiff filed the lawsuit. The researcher then performed a textual
analysis of the decisions to determine how the McIntyre opinion has been
used in these cases. This involved searching each opinion for the
specific citations to McIntyre, as well as analyzing the context in which
the court cited McIntyre. The researcher also noted any direct quotations
of the McIntyre opinion. Multiple cases citing a specific proposition in
McIntyre were noted as main themes. Three main themes emerged from
these cases. In addition, the researcher noted if the court chose to
109. For the purpose of this article, the phrase "expressive activities" is
defined as comments or postings. The time span for cases searched were those filed
between January 1996 and April 1, 2011.
110. For the purpose of this article, the word "case" is defined as a lawsuit
involving the same parties, the same claims, and subject matter. All court opinions,
no matter the level, relating to the same claim are considered as one case.
111. Harvard University's Berkman Center for Internet & Society is home to
the Citizen Media Law Project, which is co-writing an amicus brief supporting the
rights of anonymous Internet speakers. See CMLP Amicus Efforts, CITIZEN MEDIA
LAW PROJECT, http://www.citmedialaw.org/cmlp-amicus-efforts (last visited Oct. 31,
2012). The CMLP also carries the Threat Database, which catalogs legal filings
directed at those who engage in online speech. See Legal Threats Database, CITIZEN
MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://www.citmedialaw.org/database (last visited Oct. 31,
2012).
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employ a judicial test to determine whether to order the discovery of the
anonymous speaker's identity, as well as the disposition of the case.
IV. FINDINGS: MCINTYRE'S INFLUENCE
In total, the researcher found thirty-eight cases involving
anonymous online communications in which the court cited McIntyre in
deciding whether to require the defendants to disclose their identities. Of
the thirty-eight cases found, thirty-two involved claims for false speech.
In spite of this, very few cases cited McIntyre in relation to the finding
that libel and false speech receives no protection under the First
Amendment. The online media at the center of the cases included both
corporate and personal websites, online newspapers that allowed article
comments, blogs, and bulletin boards or forums. The main themes that
emerged from the analysis of the citations to McIntyre are discussed
below.
A. First Amendment Protection for Anonymous Speech
Almost all of the cases found cited McIntyre with respect to the
idea that the First Amendment protects anonymous speech. The
Dendrite court, for example, in deciding whether to grant Dendrite
International's motion to discover the name of John Doe 3, cited
McIntyre at the very beginning of its analysis."12 The case arose after
comments about the Dendrite company, in response to the publication
and news coverage of the company's quarterly report, appeared on a
forum hosted by Yahoo!"' The anonymous forum postings were critical
of Dendrite's president and the manner in which the company recognized
114revenue.
The company claimed that the statements were false, and filed
suit against many of the forum posters for breach of contract,
defamation, and misappropriation of trade secrets."' 5  Because the
112. Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 765 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App.
Div. 2001) (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)).
113. Id. at 762-63.
114. Id. at 763.
115. Id.
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majority of the forum posters used pseudonyms, Dendrite sought an
order to discover the names of the posters. 116 The trial court granted
Dendrite's motion for discovery with respect to two of the posters, but
denied the company's motion for discovery for two others because the
company had not made a prima facie showing that one poster's postings
were defamatory and that both of their postings were made in such an
unlawful manner that the court should "revoke their constitutional
protections. The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
affirmed this ruling on appeal, and set forth the standard by which the
lower courts were to decide whether to allow discovery of the identity of
anonymous speakers." 8
In McIntyre, the Court asserted that anonymity was not a valid
basis for excluding speech from the marketplace of ideas,1 a conclusion
that several subsequent cases reiterated. In Independent Newspapers Inc.
v. Brodie,120 for instance, a newspaper sought to quash a subpoena of its
records relating to commenters on its online articles.121 The Court of
Appeals of Maryland cited the McIntyre majority opinion in ruling that
the benefits of allowing anonymous speech in the marketplace
122
outweighed the public interest in knowing the authors.
Though the majority of the courts found that anonymous speech
received First Amendment protection, some courts were careful to
indicate that this protection was not without limitation. An example of a
court applying this limitation is Solers Inc. v. Doe,123 in which a software
company subpoenaed a third party seeking the identification information
of a poster who reported that the company was involved in copyright
infringement.124 The Software & Information Industry Association
(SIIA), an organization focused on preventing piracy in the software
industry, allowed individuals to anonymously report alleged misconduct
116. Id. at 763-64.
117. Id. at 764.
118. Id. at 760-61.
119. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341 (1995).
120. 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009).
121. Id. at 434-35.
122. Id. at 440-41 (quoting McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341).
123. 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. 2009).
124. Id.
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both online and by telephone.12 After Solers was accused and later
cleared of copyright infringement, it filed suit against the anonymous
individual claiming defamation and tortious interference with business
relations.126 Solers also served the SIA with a subpoena for all records
dealing with the anonymous individual's identity; SIIA filed a motion to
quash.127 The trial court granted SIIA's motion.128
The D.C. Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the trial
court.129 Although recognizing that the U.S. Supreme Court has
extended First Amendment protection to anonymous speech, the Solers
court noted that this protection was limited to only "some anonymous
speech."l30 True anonymous speech was not "a pernicious, fraudulent
practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent." 3 1 The
court in In re Baxter,132 and other courts,133 also noted that there was no
First Amendment protection for false or libelous speech. In re Baxter
arose after a man claimed that anonymous postings about him on a
website were defamatory.134 Baxter sought discovery from the
webhosting service for the website. The website owner, identified as
John Doe, made a motion to intervene to raise free speech issues before
the court.136
In discussing whether to allow John Doe to intervene and the
protection of anonymous speech, the In re Baxter court noted that the
McIntyre decision was based, in part, on the fact that the speech at issue
125. Id. at 945.
126. Id. at 946.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 947.
129. Id. at 941.
130. Id. at 950 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 951 (citing Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005)); see also
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
132. No. 01-00026-M, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26001 (W.D. La. Dec. 19,
2001).
133. See, e.g., Best Western Int'l, Inc. v. John Doe, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-
DGC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56014, at *9 (citing Cahill, 884 A.2d at 456);
Greenbaum v. Google, Inc., 845 N.Y.S.2d 695, 698 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007).
134. In re Baxter, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26001, at *2.
135. Id. at *3.
136. Id. at *4.
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in that case was not libelous or fraudulent.'3 7  Thus, the ruling in
McIntyre was narrow:
[I]t can be concluded that although the First
Amendment includes, in some circumstances (at
least where truthful political speech is involved
(McIntyre) .. .) a limited right of anonymity exists
... such a right does not exist where the statements
made are libelous, misleading, conducive to fraud
or defamatory.13 8
In McIntyre, the U.S. Supreme Court used strict scrutiny to analyze
whether the Ohio election law infringed upon the First Amendment right
to free speech. 39 Yet, few of the cases found cite the McIntyre decision
in relation to strict scrutiny. The court in Sinclair v. TubeSockTedD,140 in
deciding whether to grant a plaintiffs motion to discover the names of
YouTube posters who had made video responses about him, wrote that
the U.S. Supreme Court requires "both proof of a compelling interest and
a narrowly tailored restriction serving that interest where compelled
identification of speakers threatens the First Amendment right to remain
anonymous.',141 Likewise in Sedersten v. Taylor,142 a defamation case
initiated in response to comments made on an online news article about a
local public official, the court stated that restrictions on political speech
must be "narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest." 43
B. Motivations for Anonymity
The courts citing McIntyre also used the case in the discussion of
the motivations for anonymous speech. In Quixtar Inc. v. Signature
Management TEAM LLC,144 the U.S. District Court for the District of
Nevada noted that there were several motives for speaking
137. Id. at *27-32.
138. Id. at *33.
139. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).
140. 596 F. Supp. 2d 128 (D.D.C. 2009).
141. Id. at 131 (citing McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347).
142. No. 09-3013-CV-S-GAF, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114525 (W.D. Mo.
Dec. 9, 2009).
143. Id. at *7 (citing McIntyre, 515 U.S. at 346-47).
144. 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (D. Nev. 2008).
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anonymously.14 5 "Anonymity can focus the audience on the speech
rather than the speaker, and more pragmatically, it is a useful antidote to
reprisal and the other potential inconveniences and adversities of
publicity." 46 The case arose after a disagreement between Quixtar and
its subsidiary Signature Management TEAM, during which an
unidentified individual began to make disparaging comments about
Quixtar on several websites.14 7 In a deposition of one of Signature's
employees, Quixtar attempted to question the employee as to whether he
was the creator of the websites.14 8 The employee refused to answer the
questions.14 9 Quixtar then filed a motion to compel the employee to
answer its questions.150 The Quixtar court, referencing McIntyre, found
that anonymity was "a shield from the tyranny of the maj ority."'1
C. History ofAnonymous Speech in the United States
In the McIntyre opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court noted the long
history of anonymous speech in the United States, particularly with
respect to political issues. A number of the cases found in this study
cited McIntyre in relation to the protection of political speech. The U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington cited McIntyre in
Doe v. 2themart.com Inc.152 in relation to its finding that "[w]hen speech
touches on matters of public political life, such as debate over the
qualifications of candidates, discussion of governmental or political
affairs, discussion of political campaigns, and advocacy of controversial
points of view, such speech has been described as the 'core' or 'essence'
of the First Amendment." 153
145. Id. at 1213.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1208-09.
148. Id. at 1209.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1213 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,
357 (1995)).
152. 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wa. 2001) (citing McIntyre, 514 U.S. at
346-47).
153. Id. at 1092-93.
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The 2themart.com opinion was based on a motion by John Doe
petitioners to quash a subpoena to an Internet Service Provider seeking
identity information on individuals who had posted allegedly defamatory
statements on an Internet forum. 15 4 The court used the same examples of
the Federalists and the anonymous Anti-Federalists used by the McIntyre
Court in finding, "[a]nonymous speech is a great tradition that is woven
into the fabric of this nation's history."'
V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
In general, the themes that emerged from the cases citing
McIntyre reflected the issues the U.S. Supreme Court discussed within
the McIntyre opinion. The cases citing McIntyre included discussions of
First Amendment protection for anonymity, the historical foundations of
anonymity in the United States, the motivations for anonymous speech,
as well as the need to use a high level of scrutiny when constitutional
rights are at issue. Of the cases found, the vast majority involved claims
of false speech. In spite of this distinguishing fact, the courts continued
to cite McIntyre with respect to the protection of anonymous speech.
The researcher found few cases in which the courts decided to
allow the plaintiffs motion to compel discovery of an anonymous
defendant's identity or to deny a defendant's motion to quash a subpoena
for their identity. It appears, however, that in these cases the court either
noted that there was a limitation on First Amendment protection for
anonymous speech, or that certain kinds of speech were not protected. In
Maxon v. Ottawa Publishing Co.,156 for example, the Appellate Court of
Illinois cited McIntyre in relation to its finding that "certain types of
anonymous speech are constitutionally protected.',157 The Maxon court
ruled that a newspaper had to disclose the identity information of persons
who posted on their online news articles. Some of the posters had
made comments that accused Maxon of taking bribes.5 9  Also
154. Id at 1089-91.
155. Id. at 1092.
156. 929 N.E.2d 666 (111. App. Ct. 2010).
157. Id. at 674.
158. Id at 677.
159. Id at 670.
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compelling with respect to the Maxon case is the court's rejection of the
procedural protections for anonymous speakers found in Dendrite.'so
In the cases in which the anonymity of the defendant was
preserved, the majority of the courts used either the Dendrite test or the
test from Cahill, which modifies the criteria found in Dendrite. Both
Cahill and Dendrite cite McIntyre for the proposition that the First
Amendment protects anonymous speech, even when on the Internet. The
major concern in both cases was ensuring that the defendant's right to
anonymity was preserved until the plaintiff made a showing of
defamation. Anything less would be violating the defendant's right to
remain anonymous, and possibly subjecting the defendant to
unwarranted harassment at the hands of the plaintiff.
Yet the cases found represent only a fraction of those filed or
petitioned for with respect to online anonymous speech.161 This may
demonstrate that McIntyre is not as influential to the protection of
anonymous speech as scholars thought it could be.16 2  Further
demonstrating this is the fact that most of the courts citing McIntyre used
it as a reference citation, and not as a decision that must be followed or
explained. What the future holds with respect to the use of McIntyre is
unknown, but it is instructive to consider how the case was used in a
more recent decision on anonymous online speech.
In March 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
handed down another decision in the ongoing saga of Quixtar. In re
Anonymous Online Speakersl6 was a motion for a writ of mandamus by
certain individuals whose identities Signature TEAM was ordered to
disclose. Both the anonymous commenters and Quixtar filed for writs
of mandamus. The Ninth Circuit cited McIntyre multiple times in
deciding to deny both the commenters and Quixtar's motions.166 Like
many of the other courts in the cases mentioned above, the Ninth Circuit
used McIntyre as a reference citation for the finding that the First
Amendment protects anonymous speech, as well as noting the long
160. Id. at 675-76.
161. See supra Section III.
162. See supra notes 67-68, 94-107 and accompanying text.
163. 661 F. 3d. 1168 (9th Cir. 2011).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1171.
166. Id. at 1172-73.
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history of anonymous speech in the United States.167 The court also
noted the reasons that speakers would choose to remain anonymous. The
citations to McIntyre end, however, when the court notes that the
freedom of speech is a limited right, and that political speech is given the
highest level of protection.168 To be sure, the court's finding does not
conflict with the McIntyre ruling. It does however, demonstrate the
narrowness of the protection for anonymous speech under McIntyre or
otherwise.
In sum, the influence of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
McIntyre has not been as significant as thought possible with respect to
online anonymous speech. Although cases citing McIntyre were found,
the use of the Court's reasoning in these cases was sparse. For the most
part, McIntyre was used as a reference citation. These reference citations
fell into three categories that mirrored the issues that the Court discussed
in McIntyre, but did not provide in depth discussion of these issues.
McIntyre, then, only appears useful in these cases, the majority of which
involved defamation or false speech, for providing the foundation for the
court's ruling, and not the basis of the rulings.
167. Id
168. Id
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